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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin redirects succession spotlight; One Ivanov appears to win 
A change to the personnel composition of the Russian Government was an 
expected element of the upcoming presidential transition, but the timing and the 
apparent choice of prime minister nominee were not telegraphed by the Kremlin, 
and therefore represent an effort to keep the political establishment off kilter as 
the presidential succession unfolds.  
 
At a clearly choreographed working meeting with Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov 
during which Fradkov offered his resignation, President Vladimir Putin accepted 
the resignation and commented: "[W]e should all reflect now on how to organise 
the power and management structure in such a way as to best adapt it to the 
election campaign period and ensure it can prepare the country for the period 
after the parliamentary election and the presidential election in March 2008." (1) 
 
 The decision to accept the Prime Minister's resignation begins a process that 
likely will result in a much wider personnel shake-up in the government.  
However, the selection of a nominee for Prime Minister certainly permits the 
clearest glimpse to date into the president's plan for the 2008 succession.   A 
broad assortment of political commentators greeted the news of the resignation 
of the Fradkov government with the prediction that First Deputy Prime Minister 
Sergei Ivanov would be tapped to head the new government in a clear signal of 
Putin's preference for successor.  (2) 
 
Oddly, President Putin did not choose to make his own public announcement of 
the nomination for two days after accepting Fradkov's resignation.  The 
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announcement of Putin's choice of Viktor Zubkov to head the Russian 
government was left to Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, a longtime associate of the 
nominee and his onetime campaign manager (during an unsuccessful run for the 
Leningrad Oblast governor's seat in 1999).  
 
Even more interestingly, Putin left the Kremlin after accepting Fradkov's 
resignation to accompany another of his much-ballyhooed successor candidates, 
Dmitri Medvedev, on a trip to Chuvashia and the Belgorod Region (perhaps to 
compensate for another trip with Sergei Ivanov, Medvedev’s supposed 
competitor).  (3)  
 
While it has since become clear that the President has chosen Zubkov as the 
Prime Minister nominee (and Zubkov has won parliamentary support), the lack of 
presidential involvement in the announcement is confounding and brings into 
question Putin's commitment to his nominee.  
 
It is possible that Putin hoped to gauge public response to Zubkov's nomination 
before appearing publicly with him and providing the presidential imprimatur on 
"his" nominee.  However, Putin would have had to forward a formal letter to 
“Speaker” Gryzlov to begin Zubkov's confirmation process, thereby linking 
himself, at least officially, with the selection from the outset.  
 
It also is possible that by not disrupting or making room in his schedule for a 
formal announcement or photo opportunities, Putin was able to keep the Zubkov 
nomination quiet even within his own administration.  Certainly, Sergei Ivanov, 
who commented somewhat graciously on Zubkov's qualifications by describing 
him as "calm, restrained and absolutely adequate" also acknowledged that this 
nomination had not been raised in his conversations with Putin: "We did not 
discuss this with the president."  (4) 
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Certainly, Putin's decision to nominate Zubkov has re-centered the succession 
debate around the president himself, rather than the putative successors.    Any 
political or financial flow from Putin to the leading contenders, Ivanov and 
Medvedev, or even to the second tier candidates, such as Sergei Naryshkin or 
Sergei Sobyanin, surely will slow with this demonstration of presidential authority.  
 
The president chose the Valdai Conference, a gathering of mostly foreign 
analysts, as the forum to discuss his PM nominee in some detail.  (Over the past 
several years, Putin has chosen to provide previously unknown background or to 
break news at the Valdai Conference.  His rationale is unclear.)  When he finally 
did speak about Zubkov, Putin praised his accomplishments, his temperament, 
and his discretion:  
 
"Why Viktor Zubkov? … [H]e's a true professional, an effective administrator with 
a nice personality….  Back in Soviet times, he managed to give a boost to one of 
the worst collective farms….  He made it the best in the Soviet Union.  … He did 
almost no ideological work but was always interested in production.  …  In his 
department [Rosfinmonitoring] he has at his fingertips a massive amount of 
financial intelligence. … Not once, I would like to emphasise, did Viktor Zubkov 
abuse this trust." (5)  Perhaps he should have added, "at least not yet." 
 
An interesting development last month may shed light on the timing of the 
government's resignation:  then Prime Minister Fradkov, apparently in an attempt 
to weaken the positions of the two "First Deputies" in his government, made 
amendments to the rules of government procedures that, in effect, placed all of 
the deputy prime ministers on the same footing and gave the Prime Minister the 
authority to assign their spheres of authority and specific functions (such as 
chairing government meetings in the PM's absence).  (6)  It is unlikely that such a 
change sat well with the First Deputies, or that it escaped the notice of the 
president. 
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The clearest indication of what prompted the Fradkov government's dismissal (er, 
resignation) should come later this week, when Zubkov and Putin unveil the 
latest incarnation of the Russian government.  (7)  When the list of new ministers 
is announced, it should become obvious just who Putin perceived as "easing off 
at work and beginning to think about the shape of their own destiny after the 
election." (8) 
 
As for the new prime minister, Viktor Zubkov:  He is an economist, specializing in 
agriculture, who worked with Putin in the St. Petersburg external relation's office.   
In the late 1990s, he worked at the St. Petersburg Tax Ministry, took a run at the 
Leningrad Oblast Governor's seat, and then landed in Moscow as deputy chief 
Tax Minister.  In 2001, Putin named Zubkov to head the newly-created Federal 
Finance Monitoring Commission, where he oversaw the establishment of a 
"financial intelligence service."  He is the father-in-law of Defense Minister Anatoli 
Serdyukov, and is said to be close with presidential adviser on personnel issues, 
Viktor Ivanov.  (9)  Despite repeated rumors of his resignation (he turns 66 later 
this month), Zubkov remained head of Rosfinmonitoring and has worked with 
Viktor Ivanov on a new anti-corruption investigative body established earlier this 
year.  (The resignation rumors may have been wishful thinking by Finance 
Ministry colleagues.)  From his recent activities, it is clear that Zubkov potentially 
has access to a wide range of possible kompromat. 
 
While some commentators have claimed that Zubkov is not a "chekist" and has 
no gaps in his resume that suggest a security services career, it is unlikely that 
Zubkov, judging by the company he keeps, is without connection to the sword 
and shield.  (10)  As Putin's choice early in his administration not only to head, 
but to create from the ground up a Russian financial intelligence service, it is 
likely that Zubkov had experience somewhat more relevant than that which he 
garnered on the collective farm. 
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Viktor Ivanov seems to cast a long shadow over this move in the succession 
match.  Some commentators, notably Vladimir Pribylovsky, saw the ascendancy 
of this line connected through Viktor Ivanov to Putin as early as last February, 
when Anatoli Serdyukov was named Defense Minister:  "Serdyukov is a man of 
Viktor Ivanov.  He has close links…with the head of the Federal Financial 
Monitoring Service, Viktor Zubkov….  Zubkov, in his turn, is linked to Gryzlov and 
Viktor Ivanov.  But, more importantly, Zubkov is rather close to Putin."  
Pribylovsky went on to suggest, in February, that Zubkov might be Putin's chosen 
successor. (11) 
 
The Zubkov nomination elicits an assumption that the "caretaker" government 
scenario, (which would allow Putin to return to office in 2012) is considered viable 
in Kremlin circles.  This option would be a very naïve choice for Putin, even with 
a significantly older, trusted associate as seat warmer, and when it comes to 
power politics, Putin does not seem the least bit naïve. 
 
The status of the main contenders to succeed Putin has been shaken by the 
dismissal of the government.  With so many commentators jumping to the 
conclusion that Sergei Ivanov would be nominated to be Prime Minister by Putin, 
Ivanov's cache both rose and sank: it was buoyed by the breadth of consonance 
on his ascendance among political analysts but rapidly deflated as Zubkov's 
name was called, and it became clear that Sergei Ivanov was not entirely in the 
loop on this nomination.  However, a rapprochement noted this summer might 
yet prove to be Sergei Ivanov's wild card in the presidential race.   Despite a 
deficit of information about splits in the Kremlin ranks, Viktor and Sergei Ivanov 
apparently have been in hot competition for military-linked assets, and according 
to a report by Aleksandr Birman, Sergei Ivanov recently ceded some of his 
control to Anatoli Serdyukov, Viktor Ivanov's (and the new PM's) protégé.  In 
return, Sergei Ivanov is said to be relying on Viktor Ivanov's access to significant 
assets through Gazprom and Sberbank. (12)  Of course, in light of the Zubkov 
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appointment, what is seen as Sergei Ivanov's quid pro quo concession to Viktor 
Ivanov in fact might have been a less mutually beneficial transfer. 
 
On 19 September, Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov resigned his post as 
Defense Minister because, as the new PM Zubkov claimed, "he is a close 
relative." (13)  A Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, claimed that "according to 
the law, [Serdyukov] had to resign for ethical reasons." (14)  An interesting 
development, but it is unclear exactly what Russian law forbids in-laws from 
working within the same government.  
 
It is more likely that Serdyukov's position as Defense Minister, along with the 
access to administrative and financial resources that it provides, gave the new 
Prime Minister a far more powerful brief than the president had intended.  It 
follows that at least one of the possible successors probably approached Putin 
with this argument against Serdyukov, hence the announcement of his 
resignation.  Without any intervention, Serdyukov simply could have been 
shuffled out of the defense post when the new government composition is 
announced on Friday.  
 
As for the military's position on a possible new Defense Minister, General Staff 
Chief Yuri Baluyevsky expressed the opinion not only that the post will go to a 
civilian ("Colleagues in the government will heed opinions of such a minister 
better"), but that he does "not rule out the possibility that a woman could be our 
minister." (15) 
 
Baluyevsky further highlighted the bottom line responsibilities for a defense 
minister: "The minister's main responsibility is that a soldier should not feel 
hungry and should have a new tank." (16)  With elections and a presidential 
succession in the works, the new defense minister may address his position with 
a very different set of priorities. 
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Source Notes: 
(1) "Beginning of Working Meeting with Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov" via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/09/12/1707_type82912type82913_143
736.shtml 
(2) The list of analysts and insiders (Boris Nemtsov, Vitali Tretyakov, Gleb 
Pavlovsky, Yevgeni Kiselev, among many others) who predicted the selection of 
Sergei Ivanov may reflect the power of official press in Russia.  Clearly, Sergei 
Ivanov has been portrayed as the leading successor candidate.  See Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, Volume 4, No. 169, 13 September 07 for a more comprehensive 
list of individuals and sources that predicted Ivanov's nomination. 
(3) Russia & CIS General Newswire, 12 Sep 07, Wednesday 7:26 PM MSK via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) "Ivanov says Fradkov Government did a good job," Itar-Tass, 12 Sep 07, 
0926 EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) "Meeting with Members of the Valdai Discussion Group," 14 Sep 07 via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/ 
2007/09/14/1801_type82917type84779_144106.shtml, accessed 17 Sep 07. 
(6) New Russian government rules give equal status to deputy premiers," 
Kommersant, 7 Aug 07; BBS Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic.  
Previously, the rules only mentioned a single deputy chairman.  In the rewrite, 
deputy chairmen with specific spheres of authority are included.  However, 
nowhere do the rules (old or new) make a distinction for First Deputies.  This 
maneuver had the effect of putting Fradkov's men, Aleksandr Zhukov and Sergei 
Naryshkin, on an even footing with Putin's leading successors, Ivanov and 
Medvedev. 
(7) "President Putin held a working meeting with Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov," 
18 Sep 07 via http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/news/2007/09/144432.shtml, 
accessed 19 Sep 07. 
(8) "Meeting with Members of the Valdai Discussion Club," Ibid.  
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(9) Profile of Russian PM Candidate Viktor Zubkov via www.xinhuanet.com; 
"Zubkov, Putin Go Way Back," The Moscow Times, 13 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(10) Sergei Markov, for example, cited in The Financial Times, 12 Sep 07 via 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/332d2f7c-6123-11dc-bf25-0000779fd2ac.html.  
Accessed on 18 Sep 07. 
(11) Delo newspaper, St Petersburg, 19 Feb 07, pp 2-3 via World news 
Connection (WNC). 
(12) "The catamaran of the Ivanovs," by Aleksandr Birman, Sekret Firmy, No. 29, 
30 Jul 07; What the Papers Say (WPS), 1 Aug 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Search. 
(13) "Defense Minister resigns over Family Ties," by Miriam Elder, The Moscow 
Times, 19 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(14) Ibid.  
(15) RIA Novosti in Russian , 1004 GMT and Interfax, 1226 GMT, 19 Sep 07; 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(16) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
State Duma elections: No candidates? No issues? No problem! 
An opinion poll released in mid-August by the Levada-Center revealed that 43 
percent of the Russian electorate does not plan to vote in this year’s State Duma 
elections. (1)  That puts potential voter turnout in 2007 at 57 percent, the same 
lackluster figure recorded in State Duma elections four years ago. (2)  Moreover, 
during the past four years the number of registered voters behind those 
percentages has shrunk by about 600,000 names, from 107,675,130 in 2003 
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down to 107,062,709 today, reflecting Russia’s shrinking demographics. (3)  
While low turnout hardly qualifies as headline-grabbing news in a country where 
the word “voter” is commonly considered a prefix for “apathy,” the dwindling 
numbers of voters willing to participate in Russia’s upcoming parliamentary 
elections are a reflection of profound changes taking place behind the headlines, 
at the core of the country’s electoral system. 
 
When Russian voters were asked in August for whom they would be voting in 
State Duma elections scheduled to take place December 2, they were not 
presented with a list of candidates to select from, but with a column of political 
party flags. The change is due to a new set of Kremlin-backed electoral 
regulations, under which voters no longer cast ballots for individual candidates as 
well as for party lists, but instead only for party tickets. As of May 2005, the law 
“On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation” delegates the job of selecting would-be State Duma 
deputies to party organs, where party leaders are responsible for drawing up lists 
of qualified members. (4) 
 
The latter process is now the election’s most pivotal and least transparent 
contest. Candidates whose names appear on the party lists are ranked in 
descending order, according to their relative importance within their party. 
Assuming that the candidates’ eligibility is affirmed by the Central Election 
Committee, all that remains to be seen is what percentage of the vote each party 
will garner in the general election, and thus how many notches down each party 
list the election results will reach. By the time general elections roll around in 
December, the really important intra-party scrum will have been played out 
already and predictions of the election’s final outcome will have been made with 
a fair degree of certainty, given the abundance of statistical data measuring party 
preferences among the Russian electorate that is accessible on the Internet with 
just a few keystrokes. A simple calculation using numbers taken from Levada-
Center’s poll reveals the following: United Russia, with 59 percent of the vote, 
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would gain 265.5 out of 450 seats; the Communist party, garnering 18 percent of 
the vote, would gain 81 seats; Just Russia, with 9 percent of the vote, would gain 
about 40.5 seats. These three were the only parties in the Levada-Center survey 
that met the new 7 percent threshold requirement to qualify for seats in the State 
Duma, though the LDPR missed the target percentage by a very slender .1 
percent, garnering 6.9 percent of the total. If they eventually manage to pull in 7 
percent of the vote, they will be awarded 31.5 seats. The 31.5 seats left over 
would be handed to the winning parties with the highest remainders resulting 
from the division. (5)  In short, the suspense factor of this election is nil.  
             
The human interest factor also has gone with the elimination of individual 
candidates for voters to choose from. Whereas before, half of all seats in the 
State Duma (255 of 450) were awarded by single-mandate, that is, voters chose 
candidates to represent their districts, the current election will produce a body of 
representatives who are not answerable to voters in their region, but to the 
leadership of their respective parties. An important bond linking deputies to their 
geographic constituencies thus has been broken. (6)  Significantly, in 2003, 100 
of the 255 single-mandate seats were won by independents and minor party 
candidates, most of whom cannot hope to keep their seats in this year’s election, 
due to a hike in the eligibility threshold from 5 to 7 percent that was introduced 
together with the new system of proportional representation in the May 2005 
election law. (7) 
 
Proportional representation in itself is a fine system for choosing representatives. 
Because it has the capacity to pull in a range of diverse perspectives, 
proportional representation is the means chosen by most of the world’s major 
democracies to distribute their parliamentary seats. However, that capacity to 
embrace a range of political viewpoints rests upon the bedrock of party values: 
parties must have a well-defined platform, and voters must understand what 
political values those parties represent. Those conditions are absent in Russia. 
When President Putin initiated the new law on elections in 2005, he claimed it 
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was an effort to strengthen the party system by reducing the number of parties in 
the Duma. (8)  Considering that only about four parties are expected to win seats 
according to the new rules (none of them representing the democratic sector), he 
certainly has achieved that end. But, Russia will lose something important in the 
process of winnowing down the number of viable parties. It will lose the 
cacophony of values and opinions brought to the State Duma by minor party 
members. 
 
Russia’s minor parties are a heterogeneous lot, with values and viewpoints that 
range the whole length and breadth of the country. Sergei Baburin of the 
People’s Union party claims that the State Duma is an insupportable form of 
government for Russians, who are better suited to the ancient practices of direct 
rule and peasant assemblies. (9)  Vladimir Plotnikov of the Agrarian party still is 
heard to rail against the oligarchs in his speeches calling for the protection of 
Russia’s farmers. (10)  Vladimir Ryzhkov wants to be the liberal force that 
shatters the status quo in Russian politics. In a recent interview, he suggested 
that he and his fellow independents were the real reason behind the Kremlin’s 
abolition of single-mandate districts. Since single mandates swept the mavericks 
into the State Duma along with the loyalists, he reasons, the Kremlin, fearing any 
and all new forces, dismantled the electoral system and put a more pliant 
mechanism into place. (11)             
 
Each of these politicians was elected into the legislature by citizens whose votes 
suggest that they cared about the issues these candidates embodied in their 
platforms. However few voters turn out to cast their ballots on Election Day, 
those that do deserve to be represented by a candidate who shares their values 
and priorities. Now that the candidates are obscured behind party flags, and the 
flags themselves don’t stand for any issues disapproved by the regime, the 
voters who have kept faith in the power of elections have little for which to turn 
out. That is a misfortune of no consequence, however, since that the new 
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election law also abolished the minimum voter turnout required for a valid 
election. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Kommersant, 17 Aug 07 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=796122. Poll results available on 
Levada-Center website via http://www.levada.ru/press/2007071907.html. 
(2) “Vladimir Churov: Whoever Tries to Tamper with the System, Will Have to 
Deal with Me” [interview], Moscow News, 23 Aug 07 via 
http://www.mnweekly.ru/politics/20070823/55269503.html. 
(3) Ibid.  
(4) Law “On Elections of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of 
the Russian Federation” No. 51-F3, 18 May 05 via 
http://www.cikrf.ru/cikrf/law/2/zakon_51.jsp.  
(5) Ibid., article 83. 
(6) Kynev, Alexander, “Duma on the Threshold of De-Regionalization,” APN, 22 
Aug 07 via http://www.apn.ru/publications/article17631.htm. 
(7) “Last Stretch for the State Duma” Argumenti i Fakti, 29 Aug 07 via 
http://www.aif.ru/articles/article_prmid_dta73970.html?phrase_id=11309. 
(8) Website of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Russia Votes via 
http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_electoral_system.php. 
(9) “Leader of the party ‘People’s Union’ Sergei Baburin: ‘State Duma Is an 
Inappropriate Structure for Russia,’” Izvestia, 14 Sep 07 via 
http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3108296/. 
(10) “Season for Contest,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 17Aug 07 via 
http://www.rg.ru/2007/08/17/partii.html. 
(11) “Vladimir Ryzhkov: Actually, politics is banned as a profession,” Novaya 
gazeta, 10 Sep 07 via http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/69/01.html. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
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By Fabian Adami 
 
Politkovskaya case: Berezovsky did it? 
On 7 October 2006, Anna Politkovskaya, one of Russia’s most eminent 
journalists was murdered, as she exited the elevator in her Moscow apartment 
building. Politkovskaya was known for her criticisms of President Vladimir Putin’s 
administration, and of the second Chechen war, launched in 1999.  At the time of 
her death, she was about to publish a major investigative report on torture 
practices by Russian forces in Chechnya.  It is also interesting that Politkovskaya 
was killed on President Putin’s birthday.  Over the past year, the investigation 
into Politkovskaya’s murder has gone through several stages. 
    
First, the authorities immediately descended on Politkovskaya’s apartment, 
seizing her computer, her cameras and her notebooks. Secondly, investigators 
announced that all of her most recent telephone calls were to be reviewed and 
scanned—a fact which amounted to tacit admission that Politkovskaya had been 
under electronic surveillance at the time of her death. (1)  Then, seven months 
ago, a Russian newspaper claimed that “analysis of photographs from military 
satellites taken on the day of the murder” had allowed the Security Services to 
track and arrest two individuals, allegedly Chechens. (2)  
    
Both the (apparent) satellite surveillance and the “Chechen connection” provided 
the Kremlin with problems. Why was Politkovskaya being tracked in a manner 
that could be designed purely to provide information to her killer, and which could 
only be authorized at the highest levels? What possible motive would Chechen 
rebels have for killing a journalist exposing Russian war crimes – for Moscow 
surely could not be claiming that Kadyrov loyalists had carried out the murder? 
The evidence at this point—as laid out by authorities—was so suspicious as to 
indicate to most observers that a cover up was taking place.  Now, almost one 
year after the event, the Politkovskaya case has become even more convoluted, 
and the prosecution’s case even more nefarious.  
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On 27 August, Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika’s office announced that ten 
individuals had been arrested in connection with the Politkovskaya case. 
According to Chaika’s statement, the individuals included several Chechens and 
four former MVD officers. (3)  Most significantly, one of the individuals arrested is 
a serving officer of the Federal Security Service (Moscow Central Administrative 
District Service Region), named Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Anatolyevich 
Ryaguzov. (4)  
    
The (apparent) fact of a senior FSB officer’s involvement in an assassination 
presented the Security Service and Chaika with an immediate credibility deficit. 
This they sought to solve by claiming Ryaguzov was part of a “criminal group,” 
involved in “extortion and abuse of office.” (5)  At the time of his arrest, Ryaguzov 
had apparently been under surveillance for some time.  
     
In promulgating the criminal conspiracy theory, Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika 
claimed during his press conference that Politkovskaya’s murder, as well as the 
murders of Paul Klebnikov and former Deputy Head of the Central Bank Andrei 
Kozlov, had been carried out by the same gang. Chaika claimed that the 
individual is “currently abroad.” (6)  Moreover, the killings were ordered by 
someone who wanted a return to “the old system of government in which the 
money and the oligarchs decided all, discredit the leaders of the state and 
provoke external pressure on the leadership of our country.” (7) Such language 
suggests a reference to Boris Berezovsky, whom the Kremlin has already 
accused of killing Aleksandr Litvinenko – in order to further his own interests. (8)   
    
Chaika’s and the FSB’s tactic in dealing with the Ryaguzov arrest effectively has 
been to imply that the latter was a single rotten apple infecting a clean barrel. Yet 
the arrest of such a senior Security Services officer poses a number of questions. 
First, and in a sense least important: are FSB and indeed all Security Service 
officers paid so little that they need to moonlight to make ends meet? Secondly, 
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if, as the Kremlin alleges, Berezovsky’s tentacles are spread so wide that he has 
“agents” in the Security Services, is not his recent agitation for a coup d’etat (9) 
transformed into a clear and present threat? Should not a massive investigation 
into FSB officers’ loyalty take place, especially if officers of such senior rank are 
allegedly conspiring with him? 
    
The authorities were clearly not unaware that Ryaguzov’s arrest would pose a 
public relations problem, or that inferences would be drawn from his alleged 
involvement in the Politkovskaya’s murder. A mere three days after his arrest, the 
FSB retracted its prior confirmation of Chaika’s statement, claiming that 
Ryaguzov’s arrest had “nothing to do with Politkovskaya’s murder case.” Instead, 
the charges were related to corruption and “abuse of office.” (10)  
    
These events demonstrate that the FSB and the Kremlin are desperate – but not 
necessarily to solve the Politkovskaya murder. Rather, the desperation is to “get 
Berezovsky,” even if it means sounding like a broken record and pinning 
ridiculous accusations onto him. Berezovsky is clearly an irritant. But the oligarch 
is in exile, has little political power, and Britain consistently has refused 
extradition. Therefore, the question must be asked: what does Berezovsky have 
on Putin that is causing such fear in the Kremlin? 
 
Moscow-St. Petersburg train bombing: Echoes of 1999? 
In the fall of 1999, a series of explosions occurred at apartment buildings around 
Moscow. Blamed on Chechen separatists, the bombings resulted in the 2nd 
Chechen war, and in the swift rise to power of Yel’tsin Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin, who was confirmed as Boris Yel’tsin’s successor in March 2000 elections 
by a significant margin. His victory was due in part to the view that he had 
responded to terrorism with strength.  
 
Since 1999, and in particular due to the work of now deceased FSB defector 
Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko, (11) there is increasing evidence that 
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the bombings were in fact “false flag-operations” carried out by the FSB, and 
designed to produce a ‘wag the dog’ effect for Yel’tsin’s Crown Prince.  
    
On 14 August, a train en-route from Moscow to St. Petersburg was derailed, 
apparently by a bomb. Sixty people were injured, but there were no fatalities.  
FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev was quick to react to the incident, claiming during 
televised remarks that “the threat of terrorism and extremism” in Russia had “not 
yet been eliminated,” (12) and that the perpetrators could be linked to the 
Chechen conflict. Not surprisingly, Patrushev argued that the derailment was 
proof that additional powers—naturally for the FSB—and security measures were 
necessary, especially given the Duma elections scheduled for later this year. (13) 
 
Patrushev’s  “concern” has not gone unnoticed: Speaking on Ekho Moskvy radio, 
Gazeta columnist Yulia Latynina noted that she found it “easy to believe” that the 
incident was part of a scheme designed to allow Putin loyalists to “persuade him 
to stay for the third term.” (14)  
    
President Putin’s reaction to the bombing has contrasted markedly to his 
behavior during other crises—such as the Kursk submarine sinking—when he 
was not seen or heard from for days. On this occasion, he was filmed by State 
Television, a day after the incident, conversing on his cell phone with 
Transportation Minister Igor Levitin, ordering him to “do all you can to help the 
people…and let me know, a little later, what was done.” (15) A cynical observer 
might remark that this behavior is so out of character as to be a charade, and 
that the timing of this incident is “convenient.” Sadly, such cynicism is almost 
entirely the result of past FSB shenanigans. The fact that there is cause to doubt 
the authorities is in itself a tragedy, because it detracts from horror of other 
incidents. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
Cold War II? 
On 8 August, a US military exercise off the Pacific Island of Guam ended in 
surprise when two Russian strategic bombers appeared on the horizon.  The 
presence of Russian bombers during US and NATO exercises was common 
during the Cold War, but this is the first time Russian bombers have been seen 
so deep into the Pacific since 1992. (1)  RAF and Norwegian Air Forces also 
have had to warn off long-range Russian aircraft (in the Atlantic) several times 
since July, including a formation of eight TU-95 “Bear” bombers (Russia’s 
equivalent of the US B-52) headed toward Britain on 7 September. (2)  On 17 
August, speaking to journalists during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 
“Peace Mission 2007” exercises, President Vladimir Putin announced that “I have 
decided that Russian strategic bombers will resume regular strategic combat 
duty.”  Putin noted that while Russia unilaterally had stopped strategic combat 
duty in 1992, “unfortunately not everyone followed our example.” (3)  On 6 
September, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that fourteen TU-95 “Bear” 
Bombers had re-commenced routine patrols over the Pacific, Atlantic and the 
Arctic. (4)  These events are the latest in a string of dramatic announcements by 
the Kremlin apparently designed to demonstrate that the Russian Bear still has 
sharp claws. 
 
In early August, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Navy Admiral of the Fleet 
Vladimir Masorin announced Russia’s intention to reestablish a permanent naval 
presence in the Mediterranean. (5)  Though Masorin did not give a specific 
location, the former Soviet base of Tartus in Syria is the most likely candidate.  
Masorin also announced in July that the Navy plans to begin research and 
development of six new Kuznetsov-class aircraft carriers with construction to 
begin “sometime after 2015.” (6)  
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Meanwhile, Russian Defense spending has increased 22 percent and 27 percent 
respectively over the last 2 years (7) and plans have been announced to upgrade 
existing aircraft, (8) develop a new heavy bomber, (9) increase deployment of the 
TOPOL-M ICBM, (10) and expand the Far East Fleet. (11)  Most recently, there 
was the unveiling of the “Father of all Bombs” on 12 September—a thermo-baric 
weapon, which the Russians claim is four times more powerful than the US 
Massive Ordinance Air Blast device nicknamed the “Mother of all Bombs.” (12)  
Has the Cold War snuck back?  Should the US  be dusting off old war plans and 
gearing up for Cold War II?     
 
Not exactly.  After fifteen years of neglect, overall Russian military capability is 
still well below Soviet-era levels—some analysts put it at less than 50 percent. 
(13)  Russian strategic bombers are old, and the crews—both pilots and ground 
crews—are woefully underpaid and under-trained. According to Col. Gen. Zelin, 
Russian AF Chief of Staff, Russia hopes to get its pilots 50 hours of flight time 
this year (14).  In contrast, USAF bomber pilots average 300 flying hours per 
year.  
 
The aging Russian Navy has only one aircraft carrier in its inventory, and that 
vessel has never been truly operational.  Russia has no shipyard big enough to 
build aircraft carriers and currently lacks the technology and engineering know-
how to build a carrier with the size, range and lethality of US carriers.  As for the 
“Father of all Bombs,” even if Russia does have a thermo-baric device of the size 
and proportions it claims, it is an unguided weapon with no stand-off capability 
and, therefore, presents a negligible strategic threat to any nation with even a 
rudimentary early warning/air defense capability.  Despite increases in defense 
spending, Russia’s 2007/08 defense budget lags far behind that of the US, and 
the primary beneficiaries of newer or high-tech versions of Russian planes are 
overseas customers; the first buyer for the modernized MiG-29 fighter is Yemen 
and the second is Eritrea. (15)     
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This military “resurgence” can be attributed in part to Russia’s loudly voiced 
objection to US plans to put a missile defense system in Eastern Europe – Putin 
has promised an “asymmetric” response.  Invoking Cold War practices reminds 
the world that the “energy superpower” also has nukes, and the ability to use 
them.  In the larger picture, as Russia continues to drift toward autocracy, the 
Kremlin increasingly sees less value in cooperation with the West and more 
value in framing the US as Russia’s primary enemy.  Frequent references to the 
Cold War invoke memories of the glory days of military might and international 
power for the Kremlin’s domestic audience and at the same time hint that those 
days may be returning.  Putin’s ambitious eight-year,  $189 billion, program to 
replace nearly half of Russia’s existing military hardware (16) attempts to mask 
very real problems with manpower shortages and training shortfalls in the military 
and helps divert attention from domestic social problems.  
 
According to Russia’s leaders, the Russian people want a strong ruler and they 
want to be respected as a world power.  The Kremlin is capitalizing on newfound 
oil wealth and the perception of a morally discredited America, bogged down in 
the Middle East, to tell the world that Russia is indeed an international power 
player.  The threat of US military confrontation with Russia remains very low.  
The real concern is not the resurgence of Russia’s armed forces, but their 
overseas customers.  Daily patrols by Russian bombers armed with training 
weapons (17) are unlikely to tip the strategic balance of power.  Upgraded air 
defense systems in places like Iran or Syria, and fourth-generation aircraft and 
helicopters in Venezuela carry the potential for much bigger impact.  That’s 
where the US should focus its concern. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Russia Says US Intercepted 2 of Its Bombers Over Pacific,” Washington 
Post 10 Aug 07 via http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Bush-Putin meeting in Sydney called unproductive 
In a meeting described as unproductive in both Western and Russian media, US 
President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral 
talks for about an hour on Friday, September 7, ahead of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation summit taking place in Sydney, Australia. The meeting 
followed talks between US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that took place the previous day. 
 
In a press statement following the meeting, Putin said that the presidents had 
discussed missile defense, Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization, the 
Iranian nuclear crisis, US-Russian economic relations and environmental issues. 
(1)  According to Australia’s News.Com.au, however, the meeting produced “no 
signs of progress” on the issue of US-Russian tensions over the American plan 
to install missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. (2)  
Meanwhile, both Gazeta.ru and Kommersant called the meeting an occasion to 
discuss fishing plans, in reference to Putin’s invitation for Bush to join him in a 
future fishing trip on one of Russia’s Siberian rivers. (3)  Putin issued the 
invitation after thanking Bush for his hospitality at Kennebunkport, Maine—the 
last, highly-publicized meeting between the two presidents—and thus may have 
been intended to draw attention to that meeting, which similarly failed to produce 
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any concrete results, but was an opportunity for Putin to appear on equal terms 
with the American president. 
 
On the issue of missile defense, Putin said, “We have noted that our experts are 
expected to meet shortly once again and to make a visit to Azerbaijan to the 
radar station Gabala. We thereby assert that our joint efforts continue in that 
direction.” (4)  When asked to clarify, Presidential Aide Sergei Prikhodko 
explained that joint consultations of US and Russian experts are scheduled to 
begin on September 15. (5)  These joint consultations evidently are an extension 
of the initiative that Putin proposed at the Kennebunkport meeting in July, calling 
for a joint detection and interception system based in Azerbaijan that Bush had 
described as “interesting,” but which did not change the American commitment to 
place the ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The fact that Putin 
continued to emphasize that proposal, rather than raise the issue of the main US 
missile defense plan, seems to indicate that, at this point, he was more interested 
in saying that “progress is being made” than in trying to influence the American 
position. 
 
The ministerial meeting was described in even vaguer terms. According to 
Lavrov, he and Rice discussed “the most pressing issues of the day…in 
particular, the issue of regional security and strategic stability.” (6)  He did not 
elaborate on what these issues were. One may speculate that based on the fact 
he emphasized regional security and stability, the focus of the talks was North 
Korea and its nuclear weapons program, although no mention was made of any 
Russian role vis à vis the Korean crisis. 
 
The fact that no major breakthroughs occurred during the presidents’ meeting 
does not mean that Russia’s participation in the summit was entirely meaningless 
or unproductive. A major component of the APEC summit was a meeting of 
foreign ministers and ministers of all the member states, for which the Russian 
delegation included Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Minister of Economic 
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Development and Trade German Gref. Some observers argue that it was this 
meeting that was the main focus of Russian diplomatic efforts at the summit. In a 
televised interview on Russia Today, political analyst Dmitri Kozyrev said that the 
main goal of the summit from Russia’s perspective was to advance the economic 
development of the Russian Far East, for which relations with APEC countries – 
particularly China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the United States – is 
critical. (7)  This idea is supported by a statement made by Lavrov, who put forth 
the idea of hosting the next APEC meeting in the city of Vladivostok, stressing 
that for Russia, the economic development of the Vladivostok region, and the Far 
East in general, is a top priority. (8)  Whether or not there is a chance of that 
happening, the proposal itself may be a sign that Far Eastern development was, 
in fact, the main theme of Russian participation in the summit. If that is the case, 
then the summit did bring some concrete benefits for Russia, such as an 
agreement with Australia to purchase uranium over the next 30 years. Even if in 
pure economic terms nothing of great significance was achieved at the summit, 
the successful Australian deal and Russia’s proposal to host the next conference 
may be considered as a political success, in that Russia’s prestige as a 
significant and interested party in APEC, and thus as a major player on the world 
stage was elevated as a result. 
 
According to Vasili Sergeev of Gazeta.ru, the most important achievements of 
the APEC summit for Russia and the US, respectively, were Bush’s historic offer 
to North Korea for a permanent peace settlement in exchange for suspension of 
its nuclear weapons program and Russia’s uranium deal with Australia. (9)  
Interestingly, neither subject was mentioned by Bush or Putin in the press 
conference following the meeting, meaning that if they discussed these issues, 
both had reasons not to publicize the fact. For Putin, recognizing the US 
diplomatic breakthrough in relations with North Korea would have been 
equivalent to independently praising a major American success. For Bush, on the 
other hand, mentioning the uranium deal would have put Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard in the spotlight for criticism, even though the Russian and 
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Australian sides both insist that the uranium is to be used for civilian purposes 
only, and the agreement specifically forbids the transfer of Australian uranium to 
Iran and Syria. While these are very different issues, they are very sensitive 
subjects for both sides: for Russia, its loss of influence over the negotiations on 
the Korean Peninsula (the American peace initiative having made Moscow’s role 
in the Party of Six largely irrelevant), and for the United States, its inability to 
exercise sufficient influence on Russia’s nuclear dealings – this time with a major 
ally. 
 
It appears, then, that Russia failed to use the APEC summit in Sydney to make 
any significant changes in its relationship with the United States, but that 
nonetheless, Russian participation in the summit produced some benefits. At the 
very least, it established Russia’s status as an active player in the Asia-Pacific 
region, and resulted in at least one important agreement with another major 
APEC member state. As for Putin’s apparent lack of enthusiasm at the summit 
(he was described as looking “visibly grim” after the meeting), (10) the fact that 
the summit came only days before the reshuffling of the Russian government and 
the naming of Zubkov as prime minister is evidence that his mind simply may 
have been somewhere else. In that case, the lack of any breakthroughs may be 
summarized in two words describing the APEC summit for Putin: bad timing.     
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Russian missile incident 
On 6 August, an undetonated missile landed near Tsitelubani, a village under 
Georgian control in the separatist South Ossetian republic and located several 
miles from a Georgian radar base. Georgia claimed that the missile came from 
Russian planes that violated Georgian airspace; Russia denied the charges. 
Georgia sought to bring the situation to the attention of the international 
community. Soon, several investigative groups came to inspect the missile’s 
landing site. One group included representatives from the United States, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Sweden. A second was composed of experts from Great Britain, 
Estonia and Poland. The third group consisted primarily of Russian officials. 
OSCE Chairman-in-Office Miguel Angel Moratinos also appointed a special 
envoy, former foreign minister of Croatia Miomir Zuzul, to look into the matter. 
 
After inspecting the available evidence, the two non-Russian investigative groups 
both concluded that the missile in question was an anti-radar Raduga Kh-58 fired 
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from an SU-24. Unsurprisingly, the Russian investigation did not support those 
claims. 
 
The OSCE investigation, falling prey to the organization’s norm of consensus, 
failed to determine the source of the missile, but did propose preventative 
measures, including the appointment of a rapid reaction representative for the 
Caucasus, to ensure that future events could be promptly investigated. (1)  In 
order to be approved, these measures would run up against Russia’s OSCE 
veto. However, the OSCE representative did seem to pride himself on 
maintaining open communication channels between Russia and Georgia 
throughout the conflict. 
 
Due to the involvement of the international community, the Tsitelubani incident 
has overshadowed several other altercations, which have taken place in the 
intervening six weeks and have the potential to aggravate tensions between 
Russia and Georgia. On 22 August, Georgian forces fired on a plane over Upper 
Abkhazia, claiming that it had violated Georgia’s airspace. (2)  Shota Utiashvili, 
an upper-level interior ministry official, stated that the plane was believed to be 
Russian, although he produced no evidence of this assertion. (3)  Abkhazian 
authorities confirmed that a plane had crashed in the lower Kodori Gorge on the 
day in question, although, according to their statements, the aircraft “most likely” 
was Georgian. (4)  Russian officials denied that the plane was Russian and, in 
keeping with the two countries’ established relation pattern since the Rose 
Revolution, accused Georgia of manufacturing provocations. (5)  In the wake of 
the uproar over the Tsitelubani confrontation, neither country has seemed 
interested in pressing the Abkhazian airplane incident further. 
 
A second noteworthy occurrence was Russian authorities’ interception of two 
men who they claimed were Islamic terrorists, as they attempted to cross into 
Russia’s Karachai-Cherkessia region from Georgia in early September. The two 
men were killed in a clash with Russian border guards. According to Russian 
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officials, one of the men, operating under the alias of Abubakar, was the leader of 
Islamic militants in Karachai-Cherkessia. (6)  The Georgian border police 
declined to comment on the incident. (7)  The clash follows Russia’s claims that 
Georgia is unable to control its own borders. Relations between Russia and 
Georgia have been particularly tense in the past over Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, 
through which Russia alleges that Chechen separatists are able to enter 
Chechnya. 
 
Neither Russia nor Georgia have made much fuss over the Abkhazian plane 
crash or the militants’ Karachai-Cherkessia border crossing, beyond exchanging 
the ritual accusations and denials. Instead, both have channeled their diplomatic 
efforts into affecting international opinion over the Tsitelubani missile skirmish. 
 
Military budget increases 
Georgia’s Defense Ministry budget is slated to receive its second increase of the 
year, according to recent parliamentary activity. The yearly budget is being raised 
from approximately $566 million in June to $769 million. (8)  Initially, the defense 
budget for 2007 was $310 million. (9)  The infusion of money for defense 
spending has been attributed to Georgia’s aspirations for NATO membership. 
However, it is possible that Tbilisi also aims to demonstrate that its efforts to 
reincorporate South Ossetia and Abkhazia are backed by an increasing military 
might. 
 
The construction of military bases near the country’s breakaway regions also 
suggests that Georgia has its eye on more than just its admittance into NATO. 
Last year, Georgia opened a military base in Senaki, near Abkhazia. This year, a 
Georgian military base is scheduled to open in a few months in Gori, near 
Tskhinvali, the capital of separatist South Ossetia. The Gori base was built fairly 
rapidly, suggesting that it might be part of the state’s most recent push to bring 
that area back into the fold. The Georgian military also is training a 500-strong 
rapid reaction force to be stationed in Tbilisi. 
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Georgia’s troop strength is also on the rise. A recent proposal submitted to 
Parliament advocates increasing the army from 28,000 to 32,000 troops. (10)  
Officials explain that this increase is related to the number of Georgia’s troops in 
Iraq. In June, Georgia upped its troop commitment there from 850 to 2000; on 14 
September, however, the Defense Ministry announced its intention to reduce its 
troop contribution to 300. (11)  Currently, Georgia is the third largest contributor 
of manpower to the coalition, after the United States and Great Britain. Georgia’s 
troops patrol the Iraq-Iran border to interdict smuggled weapons and other 
contraband. 
 
All told, the budgetary success of Georgia’s Defense Ministry may bode ill over 
the long haul for authorities in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Increased bread prices squeezing family budgets 
Prices for staple goods such as flour, meat, bread, cooking oil, and gasoline have 
risen recently in Uzbekistan, causing shortages even in Tashkent and sparking a 
number of protest demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley (in the towns of 
Andijon, Namangan, and Ferghana, as well as in the village of Yangi-arab). (1)  
The price of bread increased 50-100% as flour imported from Kazakhstan 
doubled in price; since bread has become the dietary mainstay for poverty-
stricken families, (2) the price increase puts a significant portion of Uzbekistan’s 
population at risk of going hungry.  The protests over price hikes occurred just a 
few days after President Islom Karimov’s speech commemorating 16 years of 
Uzbek independence, during which he proudly declared that that his country had 
succeeded in achieving self-sufficiency in grain production and is not only able to 
meet domestic demands for grain but also exports grain to other CIS states, 
Afghanistan and Iran. (3) 
 
In reality, Uzbekistan still imports grain from Kazakhstan, (which is the largest 
grain exporter in Central Asia) because Kazakh grain is of higher quality.  
Although Uzbek grain farmers enjoyed a larger than expected harvest this year 
(the average yield was 4.8 tons per hectare, exceeding both last year’s harvest 
and the target amount set for the 2007 harvest), the wheat is of poor quality and 
commercial bakers prefer to buy Kazakh wheat.  An added problem is that in 
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order to meet government grain harvest targets, farmers must devote more and 
more of their acreage to sowing wheat, at the expense of other, more profitable 
crops.  Uzbek farmers receive only 118 soms (approximately 10 US cents) per 
kilo of wheat from the state, in spite of the fact that the market price is at least 
five times as much.  Should they try to sow other crops on their wheat fields, 
local law enforcement authorities step in to prevent and/or punish them. (4) 
 
The rising cost of basic foodstuffs combined with an increase in the retail price of 
gasoline (5) could have a devastating effect on the population’s access to even 
the most basic staples.  Poverty and malnutrition already pose serious problems 
in Uzbekistan: according to a recent UNDP National Human Development 
Report,the consumption of meat products was only 32% of the recommended 
level in 2005, while the consumption of bread and other products made from 
wheat flour was 1.6 times higher than normal. (6)   Many families who cannot 
afford meat and other food products have come to rely on bread as their dietary 
mainstay; (7) for them, the increased cost of wheat could lead to starvation.  
Bread prices have increased from 200 soms per loaf (or round – traditional 
Uzbek bread is baked in large, flat rounds) at the beginning of August to today’s 
price of 400-500 soms; one kilo of flour now costs no less than 1,000-1,100 soms 
(1,273 = US$1); (8) meat has increased in price from roughly US$3.75 to nearly 
$6 per kilo. (9)  The retail prices of gasoline and diesel fuel were raised 17-22% 
in early August for domestic supplies; gasoline imported from Russia and 
Kazakhstan costs twice as much. (10)  Even fares on public transport have risen, 
by as much as 25%. (11) 
 
At least one quarter of Uzbekistan’s households already live in poverty: A UN 
Household Budget Survey conducted in 2003 reported that 26.2% of 
Uzbekistan’s households were living at or below the poverty line (28.7% of these 
were in rural areas, 22% in urban areas), with malnutrition being one of the 
leading poverty indicators. (12)  The average monthly salary in Uzbekistan is 
$70-$80, which is what a teacher or doctor might earn, and the minimum monthly 
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salary is $12. (13)  The recent spate of price hikes could cut household buying 
power in half, plunging even more families into poverty.  To make matters worse, 
the availability of food products also is shrinking, as many private vendors have 
responded to the price increases simply by shutting down their stores and kiosks.  
The Uzbek government itself is partially to blame for this trend by ordering private 
grocery sellers not to raise their bread prices – with the cost of wheat and flour 
skyrocketing, private bakers can no longer make a profit. (14)  Increased fuel 
prices undoubtedly have caused the availability of other food products to shrink, 
especially in rural areas, where any goods not produced by the local state farms 
must be brought in by truck.  This was a significant problem even during Soviet 
times, contributing to malnutrition and illness throughout rural Central Asia. 
 
The rest of the Central Asian states are experiencing similar increases in bread 
prices, due to an upswing in the worldwide grain market that some reports 
attribute to a rising demand for grain supplies by the biofuel industry, (15) while 
others blame it on droughts and on the fact that the Kazakh government ceased 
subsidizing its wheat prices. (16)  Whatever the reason for the price hikes, rather 
than trying to address the problem collectively, each Central Asia government is 
struggling to find its own solution, sometimes to the detriment of neighboring 
states.   The State Anti-Monopoly Committee in the Kyrgyz city of Osh (located 
near the Uzbek border), apparently dissatisfied with the national government’s 
response to the crisis, decided to take matters into its own hands and banned all 
further export of wheat and flour by local traders to Uzbekistan. (17)  In an effort 
to halt bread prices from spiraling even further, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek 
Atambaev ordered 2,000 tons of grain to be sold from state reserves at below 
market price, (18) but the crisis has yet to abate. 
 
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, seems to be stuck between a rock and a hard 
place.  The government has kept such tight control over the economy that most 
industries, including agriculture, remain very centralized and have provided little 
room for the creation of private enterprise.  In fact, many government officials 
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seem to view private businesses as rivals that threaten the profit share of state-
owned industries, reducing the amount of revenue available for graft.  No 
business is too small to avoid being singled out for retribution by state authorities 
– a few weeks ago Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev ordered 
approximately twenty tax service and interior affairs ministry employees to 
confiscate meat products being sold by butchers at the Farhod Bazaar in 
Tashkent.  The butchers’ safes were also opened and the equivalent (in local 
currency) of roughly US$500 was seized.  The tax service personnel then paid 
the butchers 3,500 som (2.9 dollars) per kilo of confiscated meat (one kilo of 
mutton costs 6,000 som in the bazaar).    According to Surat Ikromov, chairman 
of the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights Activists of Uzbekistan, the 
purpose of the illegal raid on the butchers’ stalls was to force them to reduce their 
meat prices to 3,500 som per kilo, far below market price.  Two of the butchers 
were arrested. (19) 
 
Tactics such as these will serve only to stifle further the development of private 
enterprise in Uzbekistan, scaring off not only potential local entrepreneurs, but 
foreign businesses, as well.  The recent price hikes clearly have illustrated the 
vulnerability of Uzbekistan’s economy and have brought enormous pressure to 
bear on an already heavily burdened population.  Most of Uzbekistan’s citizens 
do not earn sufficient income in order to weather a rise in the cost of living and 
the government does not appear willing or able to create a social safety net for 
them to fall back on when times are hard.  Foreign investment could help 
reinvigorate existing industries and create new opportunities for both large and 
small businesses, providing much needed new sources of income for the nation’s 
work force.  If, on the other hand, President Karimov continues to administer his 
country as though it were a feudal fiefdom, the next round of price hikes may 
bring Uzbekistan’s economy dangerously close to collapse. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The campaign that could change voting patterns…. 
On 30 September, Ukraine’s voters go to the polls for the fifth time in four years.  
This time, they will vote again for their parliament (Rada) after the convocation 
elected last year was dismissed by President Viktor Yushchenko.  Three 
important factors in the current campaign are identifiable and will likely affect the 
vote:  apathy, the use of American campaign consultants and a new battle for 
Eastern voters.  In particular, while two of the country’s major blocs generally are 
focusing on historical regional strongholds, one is embarking on a potentially 
risky strategy designed to break through the East-West voting divisions that have 
plagued Ukraine since its independence 16 years ago. 
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Will voters go to the polls? 
The campaign to date has been characterized by general disinterest.  While 
pollsters are suggesting that upward of 65% of voters nationally still say they plan 
to cast their ballot, there is genuine concern among Ukraine’s biggest parties that 
this apathy could lead to a serious decrease in turnout.  This is especially true for 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and the leading opposition 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYUT), both of which view turnout as key to their 
success on election day.   
 
Yanukovych, in particular, appears worried about surveys that suggest 
supporters in his traditional Eastern and Southern strongholds will vote at lower 
rates than the supporters of other parties in the Central and Western regions.  
Speaking on a regional television station in Zaporizhya, the Prime Minister 
suggested that he has seen statistics that predict less than 60% of voters in the 
East and South will cast a ballot. “If this indeed will be the turnout,” he said, “then 
… it won't be necessary to blame anyone. … If the Ukrainian people want to 
have an orange government in power, it means, this is what we'll get, if this will 
be the turnout.  If it [Ukraine] does not want this - it is necessary for everybody to 
get out and vote. September 30th – go to the elections.  This is the main question 
for the country and the Ukrainian people." (1) 
 
However, judging by the lack of campaign energy in Kyiv, it is clear why 
Yanukovych is not the only politician who is worried.  “If I have time,” said one 
man on Kyiv’s main Kreshchatik Boulevard, “I will vote for Yulia [Tymoshenko].”  
Then, with a shrug, he added, ““It doesn’t really matter.  They’re all the same.  
Well, maybe she’s a little bit better, but it doesn’t make a difference.”  This 
opinion was echoed by numerous Kyivites around the city in informal 
conversations with this author.  Seamstresses working in one of Kyiv’s tailoring 
shops, men standing in line at the central McDonald’s, women relaxing in a park, 
and waiters working at a restaurant on the outskirts of the city all said they would 
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vote “if I have time,” or  “if I am near a polling station,” or simply “if I feel like it.”  
These are, of course, unscientific samples, but illustrative nonetheless.  (2) 
 
Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko have tried to respond to this attitude with 
aggressive television and radio advertisements calling on Ukrainians to vote.  
Tymoshenko  has introduced a new advertisement with a very direct message: 
“All politicians are not the same.  Yulia is different.” 
 
Since polls suggest that the race between the Party of Regions and 
Tymoshenko’s bloc is tightening, both leaders understand that the loss of even a 
few percentage points of support as the result of apathy could determine whether 
or not they will be able to form a governing coalition with their partners. 
 
Goodbye Russian spin doctors, hello Americans 
Recently, in the Washington Times, an opinion editorial appeared by Michael 
Caputo, whose byline on the piece noted that he is a “Miami writer” who “lived in 
Russia from 1994 to 1999 as an election adviser to Boris Yeltsin's administration 
and was a media director of former President George H.W. Bush's 1992 re-
election [campaign].” (3) 
 
In actuality, Michael Caputo is a public relations specialist who has worked in the 
past with representatives of Davis, Manafort & Freeman, an American consulting 
company now working for Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.  It is unclear why 
the Washington Times chose to allow Caputo to appear as an independent 
analyst; a quick Google search uncovers his profession and connections. 
 
Caputo’s likely connection to the Party of Regions is further suggested by the 
tone of the piece, and by the use of – to put it nicely – alternative interpretations 
of events over the past two years.   Listing the piece’s questionable 
interpretations would take too much time and space, but it is perhaps instructive 
that these interpretations relate only to the work of Yulia Tymoshenko, and that 
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they somehow always support Caputo’s call for voters to reject Tymoshenko’s 
campaign. 
 
The Caputo piece serves primarily to spotlight the emergence of American 
political spin doctors in Ukraine.  Davis, Manafort & Freeman first worked for 
Yanukovych during the 2006 parliamentary campaign, when they established a 
base in Kyiv to assist the campaign.  Davis, Manafort and their allies have 
gradually replaced Russian spin doctors, who have become less important over 
the past year. “Strategies which could work well on Russian territory often did not 
work out in Ukraine,” wrote Irina Khmara in Nezavisimaya gazeta.  (4) 
 
Davis and Manafort, however, created a new Western-friendly public image for 
Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, which helped propel the party to a first 
place showing in 2006, and earned praise from Western corporations.  However, 
this image has been undermined by recent government decisions instituting 
manual price controls in the gas and wheat sector, as well as major delays in 
passing WTO-related legislation.  There are signs, therefore, that the strategy 
may not have the success in 2007 that it had previously. 
 
American PR consultants are reportedly working also with President Viktor 
Yushchenko.  According to Business Ukraine magazine, Washington lobbyist 
Sten Anderson now advises the president on media communications and has 
done so since the beginning of the year.  Anderson’s influence is evident in 
Yushenko’s new confident appearances before the media.  There is no evidence, 
however, that Anderson is influencing the day-to-day campaign of Yushchenko’s 
Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense Bloc (OU-PSD).  (5) 
 
Lobbyist Ron Slimp of Washington, DC-based TD International also has been 
representing Yulia Tymoshenko and BYUT in the United States, since the 
beginning of the year.  Slimp appears to be the only US representative of a 
Ukrainian politician officially registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
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(FARA), which “requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a 
political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their 
relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and 
disbursements in support of those activities.” (6)  Tymoshenko has encouraged 
other DC lobbyists working for Ukrainians to comply with FARA, as required by 
the US State Department. 
 
Slimp is based in the US and appears to focus solely on Tymoshenko’s outreach 
to US media and political representatives. 
 
A national party? 
Unlike in 2006, when significant focus was placed on Kyiv, today’s campaign is 
taking place largely outside the capital.  Yushchenko and OU-PSD so far have 
spent considerable time campaigning in Western regions that were the 
president’s strongholds in 2004.  Our Ukraine lost a fair amount of support in a 
number of Western regions to Yulia Tymoshenko in 2006 and now hopes to bring 
these regions back into the Our Ukraine stable. 
 
 At a 10,000 strong rally (named a “popular assembly”) in Lviv Oblast, 
Yushchenko praised all “democratic forces,” saying Our Ukraine and BYUT were 
working “shoulder to shoulder” against “betrayal.”  But he asked voters to 
“support my team, Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense. As president and as a 
citizen, I am convinced I have the right to request you to do this, as they are the 
third force, patriotic and professional, which can effectively help me implement 
your plans.” (7) 
 
Although Yanukovych immediately lashed out at Yushchenko for injecting himself 
into the parliamentary campaign, calling the action “unconstitutional,” it appears 
that technically Ukraine’s president is prohibited from being a member of a 
political party, but not from campaigning for it. 
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Unlike OU-PSD, the Party of Regions and BYUT are both, to different extents, 
attempting to attract voters in regions where previously they have found little 
support.  This focus on territory that crosses established East-West and North-
South voting patterns is new and could signal a shift in voter allegiances. 
 
The Party of Regions is concentrating largely on its Eastern base, but also has 
shown a significant increase in campaign activity in the capital and surrounding 
towns, which have been “orange” strongholds.  Party leaders suggest that voters 
in this area are unhappy with President Yushchenko and the orange forces, and 
are working to convince these voters to support Yanukovych.  Party of Regions 
billboards predominate in Kyiv (BYUT complains that many of its billboards have 
been summarily removed), with the party’s campaign booths clearly outpacing 
those of BYUT and OU-PSD.  At a large BYUT rally in Bila Tserkva (Kyiv Oblast), 
the Party of Regions held a small, but significant demonstration nearby. 
 
In the Central region, which appears to be both the most apathetic and the most 
politically savvy, it is unclear the extent to which this campaign by the Party of 
Regions can work.  It demonstrates, however, the desire of the Party of Regions 
to position itself as more of a “mainstream,” center party. 
 
In an interview on 12 September, Tymoshenko confirmed that her bloc had 
decided to use the majority of its resources to try to break through in the East 
and the South of the country, which historically have been Yanukovych 
strongholds.  “After a year and a half of the current Yanukovych government, 
there are significant numbers of voters in eastern and southern Ukraine who are 
disappointed,” she said, “which is why we are focusing two thirds of our entire 
campaign time in the region.”  The BYUT leader suggested that, for the first time, 
ideological differences of language and foreign policy in the East have been 
overtaken by concerns about the standard of living. This, she said, has provided 
an opportunity to compete for Eastern votes. (8) 
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So far, although Tymoshenko’s Eastern and Southern rallies have gained far 
more participants than in 2006, surveys still indicate that old voting patterns will 
prevail.   Valeriy Khmelko, president of the respected Kyiv International Institute 
of Sociology told the Kyiv Post that  in the eight westernmost regions of the 
country, (22 percent of all voters), Orange support is eight times higher than that 
for the Party of Regions.  Meanwhile, voters in the three easternmost regions 
(also 22 percent of voters) are eight times more likely to vote for Yanukovych’s 
party. (9) 
 
Apparently because of this remaining polarization in the extreme Eastern and 
Western regions, Tymoshenko has chosen to concentrate not on the far Eastern 
Luhansk and Donetsk (Yanukovych’s home oblast) regions, but on those Eastern 
regions considered to border the “center.” 
 
She has held over 50 events in that “border” area, including Dnipropetrovsk, 
Kirovohrad, Kherson, and Zaporizhya, and has also focused on Kharkiv, which 
borders Russia, but boasts some of the country’s most active student groups.   At 
an early September rally in Kharkiv, BYUT claimed 55,000 in attendance.  
Although local officials suggested the number was 20,000, the turnout was 
significantly higher than at any previous Eastern rally.  (10)  Two separate polling 
firms found that in Kharkiv, BYUT’s rating had increased by at least 5 percent in 
the last several months. (11) 
 
All of this activity has led observers to suggest that 2007 may be the year when 
Ukraine’s parties begin to break down the regional voter division that has 
plagued the country since its independence – or perhaps the year when the 
country sees its first national party.    To do so, political leaders will have to 
overcome apathy and growing cynicism.  If this occurs, Ukraine will have taken 
one more step toward consolidating its democracy. 
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